Michigan Journal of International Law
Volume 3

Issue 1

1982

Exiting from the Soviet Union: Emigrés or Refugees?
Zvi Gitelman
University of Michigan

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjil
Part of the Human Rights Law Commons, Immigration Law Commons, Religion Law Commons, and
the Transnational Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Zvi Gitelman, Exiting from the Soviet Union: Emigrés or Refugees?, 3 MICH. J. INT'L L. 43 (1982).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjil/vol3/iss1/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Journal of International Law at University of
Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Journal of
International Law by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more
information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

Exiting from the Soviet

Union: Emigres or Refugees?
Zvi Gitelman*

INTRODUCTION
One of the most dramatic developments in the Soviet Union during the
past decade has been the mass emigration of citizens, mostly of Jewish,
German, and Armenian nationality. Emigration from the USSR had not
been permitted, except for a tiny handful, since the early 1920s, although
in the aftermath of World War II several hundred thousand Soviet citizens
managed to remain in the West. These were either prisoners of war, slave
laborers, Nazi collaborators, or simply people who took advantage of wartime chaos to flee the Soviet Union. But between 1971 and the end of 1980,
over 300,000 Soviet citizens immigrated to Israel, the United States, the
Federal Republic of Germany, Canada, Australia, and other countries in
Western Europe and Latin America. I About 246,000 of the 6migr6s are
Jews; 60,000 are Germans; 10,000 are Armenians, and there are a few
thousand Russians, Ukranians, Baltic people, and others who have emigrated. Of the Jews, about 150,000 have settled in Israel and about 80,000
in the United States; all of the Germans have settled in West Germany;
most of the Armenians have settled in the United States, although some
have gone to the Middle East and western countries of their birth. (Most
of the emigrating Armenians were born outside Soviet Armenia and immigrated to Armenia after World War II when the Soviet Government appealed to Armenians to "return to their homeland.")
Several forces seem to shape the general Soviet aversion to free emigration and account for the legal and administrative measures whose aim is
to restrict emigration as much as possible. First, a system which claims to
be constructed on a "scientific" basis and to be the most "progressive" in
the world cannot allow people to demonstrate "with their feet" the hollowness of that claim. There is no question that the USSR has lost face as
* Director, Center for Russian and East European Studies; professor of political science,
University of Michigan.
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a result of mass emigration, not only in the world as a whole but possibly
among its own citizens. Second, with twenty million people killed during
World War II and declining birth rates among the European population
(and very high fertility among Central Asians-it is likely that by the year
2000 one out of every three Soviet citizens will be of Muslim background),
the USSR is confronting a shortage of skilled labor and technical expertise,
especially in the industrial sector. 2Jews are the most highly urbanized and
educated nationality in the USSR, and among the Germans there is a high
proportion of skilled workers. 3 Third, everyone who leaves the Soviet
Union is, in official eyes, a bearer of secret, or at least sensitive, information. The USSR treats telephone books as sources of privileged information
and, in the satellite age, still forbids photographing bridges, railroads,
airports, and slums. It has ceased publishing figures on infant and male
mortality, and on grain imports, for these have reached embarrassingly
high proportions. Simply by having lived and worked in the USSR,
6migr6s are, in the Soviet view, bearers of sensitive information to enemy
states. Finally, emigration is a spontaneous process, the initiative for which
comes from individuals, not from the state. Leninist tradition prefers "consciousness" to spontaneity, and distrusts any manifestation of the latter.
Moreover, spontaneously generated emigration, in contrast to the expulsion of dissidents, raises the specter of spillover: if one person or group is
allowed to leave, why should others not do so?
Yet emigration, so distasteful to the Soviet leadership, is permitted, if
reluctantly. As the leadership has not revealed its calculations and motivations in allowing limited emigration-nor is it likely to do so-one can only
speculate on the reasoning and decision making. The original decision to
allow emigration, beginning in March 1971, seems to have been a response
to internal and external pressure for a liberalized policy. The Soviet policy
makers wanted to defuse internal dissent and to make a gesture to Western
public opinion for the purpose of expanding trade relations, garnering
economic and technological assistance, and concluding strategic arms limitation agreements. Perhaps the Soviet leaders thought that if the gates
were opened, only a small number of "malcontents" would leave, thus
ridding the USSR of undesirable citizens and simultaneously placating
Western opinion. The Soviet leadership and most Westerners were surprised by the rapid escalation of the emigration movement, by the profundity of Soviet Jewish alienation, and by the determination of both the
internal and external forces pressing for unrestricted and expanded emigration. Certainly, they seemed to be unaware of the dynamic quality of
migration whereby an initial group of migrants becomes the first link in
a migration chain which continues to extend itself. 4
Whatever the calculus of Soviet decisions, 5 about 1,000 people were
granted exit visas in March 1971, and their numbers grew in subsequent
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months. The initial emigrants were probably motivated primarily by a
desire to reunite with families in Israel and by ideological commitments to
Jewish nationalism and culture. As time went on it became apparent that
other motivations-political alienation, economic dissatisfaction, family
considerations-were impelling people to leave the country. 6 In fact, the
Soviet authorities themselves used the vehicle of emigration to expel, in
effect, dissenting writers and other oppositionists. They were "persuaded"
to apply for visas to Israel, even those who were neither Jews nor Zionists,
and left the country under the same conditions as the Jewish 6migr6s,
though they then settled in Western Europe or the United States for the
most part. Other political dissidents, as well as those who were not actively
opposing the regime but were simply alienated from it, began to use the
Jewish emigration route out of the country, giving rise to the witticism
popular in Leningrad that "A Jewish wife is not a luxury but a means of
transportation." One might say, borrowing Albert 0. Hirschman's terminology, that while "loyalty" had been the only practical option open to
the Soviet citizen in the Stalinist period, and "voice" became a possibility
with the rise of dissidence in the 1960s, in the 1970s "exit" was added to
the list. 7
The three countries involved in Soviet Jewish migration-the USSR,
Israel, and the United States-perceive the 6migr6s quite differently and
are in disagreement as to whether or not they are "refugees." The conditions, discussed below, shaping the lives of most Soviet Jews seem to bring
these people under the rubric of the 1980 U.S. Refugee Act: they are
"persecuted or... [have] a well-founded fear of persecution on account
of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
political opinion." 8 Paradoxically, however, the Soviet Union and Israel
concur in disagreeing with the categorization of Soviet Jewish emigr6s as
refugees. The following sketches of the situation of Soviet Jewry and of
the development of the movement for emigration illuminate the basis for
the differing perceptions of the 6migr6s and facilitate an independent
judgment of the status appropriate to them.

JEWS IN THE SOVIET SYSTEM
For about twenty years after the Bolshevik Revolution, Jews enjoyed complete access to all educational, vocational, political, economic, and cultural
opportunities provided by the system. While Judaism, Zionism, and Hebrew were repressed, sometimes with great force, this was done as part of
the drives against religions and non-Communist political ideologies and
movements. There is little evidence that Jewish ideologies and movements
were systematically treated worse than others. Only a Sovietized Yiddish
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culture was permitted the Jews, but by the end of the 1930s, in keeping
with the deemphasis of non-Russian cultures, that too was phased out or
abolished by force. 9Following the second world war, in which two million
Soviet Jews died, an explicitly anti-Jewish campaign was launched, culminating in the total closing of all Jewish cultural facilities in 1948 (with
the exception of a few synagogues) and the murder of leading Jewish
cultural figures in 1952. 10 For the first time, individual Jews who had no
connection with Zionism or Jewish culture and who were highly acculturated into Russian culture, were prevented from assimilating into Russian society and were singled out as "alien," "rootless" elements, denied
equal educational, political, and vocational opportunities.
These restrictions were eased somewhat after Stalin's death, but only in
1961 was some semblance of Sovietized Yiddish culture restored. The
excesses of Khrushchev's campaigns against religion and "economic speculation" were curbed by his successors, but most non-Soviet observers agree
that Jews have been consistently and widely discriminated against by
Soviet policies of the last fifteen years. 11 Substantial evidence supports
this view. First, Jews are no longer accepted into the military academies,
foreign service, foreign trade ministry, or educational and research institutes which deal with foreign cultures, foreigners, or defense-related matters. The higher echelons of government, party, journalism, or other highly
visible public offices are also closed to them. Second, the number of Jewish
students in higher education has dropped from 111,900 in 1968 to 66,900
in 1976, and since 1971 Jews have encountered great difficulties in getting
into higher educational institutions. Since the other channels for upward
mobility have been closed, the severe diminution of higher educational
opportunities blocks the last open channel (restricted in any case largely
to science and technology) to vocational and social advancement for Soviet
Jews. Third, there still is not a single Jewish school of any kind for the
nearly two million Soviet Jews, though other, far smaller, peoples, including those without compact, territorially-based populations, have schools
and other cultural facilities in their respective languages. Fourth, Soviet
propaganda has singled out Jews and Jewish culture for especially harsh
criticism. While often disguised as "anti-Zionism," this material does not
differentiate between Zionists and Jews and it labels Zionism a "version
of Fascism no better than the Hitlerite one." 12 Finally, this official posture
has reinforced and given license to social antisemitism, which is freely
expressed despite legal strictures on it (which are never enforced). 13
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POLICIES AND PROCEDURES
OF JEWISH EMIGRATION
Paradoxically, since 1971 one of the modes of persecution of Soviet Jews
has been the harassment and deliberately created uncertainty and tension
connected with their attempt to emigrate. Ironically, emigration is not a
right enjoyed by all Soviet citizens, but a "privilege" of some of the more
persecuted peoples of the USSR, including Jews. 14 This privilege was not
easily won. By 1969, some Soviet Jews had become aware that several
hundred of their compatriots had managed to emigrate to Israel in the
previous years to be reunited with family members there. In August 1969,
eighteen Georgian Jewish families petitioned the United Nations to intervene with the Soviet authorities to allow their emigration to Israel. 15 In
November and December 1970, eleven persons, including two non-Jews,
were tried in Leningrad for the attempted hijacking of a plane in order to
get out of the country. Although the hijacking was planned, the defendants were not caught in the act. 16 The sentences, announced on Christmas eve, included two death sentences and several long prison terms, and
they aroused a strong reaction within and without the Soviet Union, placing the issues of Soviet Jewry and emigration on the agenda of world
politics. A few months later the Soviets permitted 1,000 Jews to leave for
Israel, and what had been a trickle from 1968 to 1970 turned into a steady
stream after March of 1971.
But emigration, grudgingly conceded by the authorities, offers new
opportunities for harassment and intimidation. Emigration is seen, not as
a right, but as a concession to reprehensible people. Emigration is allowed
on only one ground-family reunification. Emigration is "an incidence of
political dispensation ...

a special privilege conferred ... by the organs

of the state and not something.., a person can claim unilaterally, independently of or in opposition to the regime's expressed wishes." 17 This leads
to attempts to persuade potential emigrants to reconsider, to shame them
out of their decision, or even to punish them for it and to deny their
applications. At the same time as individuals are discouraged, a massive
media campaign aims to convince Soviet citizens that emigration is a tragic
mistake, at best, and the act of ingrates or traitors, at worst. For those who
persist and go through the emigration process, it is very often humiliating,
demeaning, costly, risky, and exhausting. No doubt this results partially
from the inherently laborious and enervating working of the Soviet bureaucracy, and partially from a calculated effort to make the process as
unpleasant as possible, intended to discourage all but the most insistent
and durable.
Regulations and procedures governing the granting of a passport and/or
exit visa are not published in the USSR, lending credence to the assertion
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expressed above about the Soviet view of emigration. A local office of the
Department of Visas and Registration, known as OVIR, accepts applications for permission to leave the country. Often its hours and workdays
are severely limited and made highly inconvenient. Accepted applications
are forwarded to the internal affairs ministry of the republic for decision,
although the local organs of that ministry may make some decisions. With
the application to leave, one must submit the following documents: (1) an
invitation from relatives abroad (a vyzov), since emigration is justifiable
only on the grounds of reunification of families; (2) a declaration of reasons
for wanting to emigrate; (3) an autobiography; (4) character certification
from one's place of employment (kharakteristika)(no longer required in all
cases); (5) permission from one's parents (regardless of the applicant's
age); (6) permission from one's former spouse, if one is divorced; (7) a
certificate from the house committee in one's place of residence; (8) copies
of birth certificate, marriage license, divorce decree, educational degrees
and diplomas, and certificates of death of relatives; (9) photographs of the
applicant. 18 All these documents must be submitted in person. Needless
to say, these requirements present opportunities for harassment and delay,
since supervisors may refuse to give a kharakferistika,house committees may
do the same, and vengeful or ideologically antagonistic former spouses or
parents may withhold needed permission. In 1980, authorities very strictly
enforced the proviso, hitherto applied only occasionally, that the vyzov
must be sent by a "first degree" relative (in most cases only a parent or
child) living in Israel. By this means, the number of emigrants in 1980 was
cut to 40 percent of the record-setting number (51,000) in 1979. Quite
often, vyzovy sent from abroad never reach the Soviet addressee.
According to Soviet law, a decision on the application must be rendered
within a month. Applicants are notified of the decision in person or by
telephone, but almost never in writing. In the great majority of cases, no
reason is given for the decision, and in the case of a refusal, there is no
judicial recourse, though a periodic review of the application-originally
limited to once a year, and since 1976 allowed every six months-may be
requested.
Should the application to emigrate be approved, in addition to the
application fee of thirty rubles, a passport fee of 300 to 400 rubles must
be paid (it is only thirty rubles for those intending to travel to "socialist"
countries). In addition, those leaving the country for permanent residence
in Israel must renounce their Soviet citizenship, and pay a fee of 500 rubles
to cover the expenses of a petition to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet
for release of citizenship. In 1972 and 1973 an additional fee was imposed,
the so-called "diploma tax" whereby emigrants "repaid" the Soviet state
for the education it had granted them, with fees varying by the amount
of education received. When this barrier to emigration, very effective
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against Jews who have high levels of education, was vigorously protested
by Soviet Jews and foreign observers, collection of the fee was halted. The
tax does, however, remain on the books. (In order to put all of these fees
in perspective, one should bear in mind that the average Soviet monthly
wage in the 1970s was around 150 rubles.)
Aside from financial costs, there are other erratically imposed penalties
for emigration: the loss of one's job, public condemnation at a meeting of
one's peers or colleagues or in the media, and loss of student status in
universities. Emigr6s are often socially isolated, except from other applicants. Usually, no more than a month is allowed for departure, and sometimes this is abbreviated to ten days, a period in which a person must
liquidate possessions, ship some and pack others, settle all financial and
personal affairs, obtain necessary papers, and the like. Some have sold their
belongings and apartments and have proceeded to the airport or rail station
for the journey out of the country, only to be told that permission has been
withdrawn. They must stay in the country, now without an apartment,
possessions, or income. Customs regulations are strict, and 6migr6s, especially those departing by train, are subjected to humiliating searches and
often outright thievery by border guards, particularly at the border crossing point at Chop, where the Vienna-bound train passes. 19 For example,
in order to be taken out of the country, furniture must have been owned
for at least a year; only one wedding ring of gold and one piece of jewelry,
worth less than 250 rubles, may be taken out. The expense of emigration
can total 1,500 rubles per adult in a family, the equivalent of an average
yearly wage. 20
The atmosphere surrounding emigration can be perceived in the reports
of the 6migr6s themselves. One young linguistics specialist, who had been
teaching English to applicants for emigration, was called in to the KGB and
told by an official "I wouldn't say it is illegal, but I would not say it is
natural to teach those who wish to leave their own country." The official
asked the linguist to report on the activities of the students, claiming that
this would enable the authorities to "help them":
You are an extremely intelligent person, you can observe them. Some of them
may even have dangerous intentions and we will be able to stop them
without doing them any harm. By providing information you can actually
help some of your friends. I should tell you that Jewish emigration is a minor
problem and we waste precious time on those light-minded people, but we
have serious troubles in Lithuania and elsewhere.
The linguist, frightened and confused, tried to put off the requests that
he act as an informer. The KGB persisted, introducing a second official who
made some revealing statements about the KGB perception of the emigra-
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tion "problem." The official's perception in 1974 was that most of the "true
Zionists" had already emigrated, and those who remained were trying to
persuade others to follow them out of the country. "But the others care
for wealth, for adventure; they are not anxious to die for Israel or for any
other cause. We should persuade them to change their minds and if we had
more information, this would be easier." He then told the linguist of his
troubles:
You heard about that doctor who returned from Israel. He told awful things
about Israel, among them that Hebrew is like Chinese and they also write
with a brush, and we let him speak on t.v., which was certainly a mistake.
Now we are getting hundreds of letters-Russians are indignant that such
a fool could be a doctor, a professor, and Jews are furious because he slanders
Israel. We really should find out how to influence people not to leave. 21
Having refused to cooperate with the KGB, the linguist was given the
choice of giving up his English lessons or of emigrating himself. He decided
upon the latter, and within two months after his application, left the
country.
Another young professional was born and raised in the RSFSR (Russian
Soviet Federative Socialist Republic) and held a promising position in what
was considered one of the most pleasant and "liberal" research institutes
in the country. He had no connection with the Zionist movement, and as
late as August 1971, he says, he could not conceive of the idea that all one
had to do to leave the USSR would be to apply to do so. However, when
his parents died, the idea of applying came to him and he submitted his
papers. He made what he calls a "gentlemen's agreement" with the Komsomol, the youth organization of the Communist Party-he would resign
in order not to embarrass them, and they would not denounce him. The
director of his institute called him in for a cordial chat, and tried to get the
young researcher to change his mind. One of the arguments he used was,
roughly, as follows: "Do you realize how this will affect your colleague X's
[a Jew] position? Do you know how much it took to get you in here?"
These remarks, made in all sincerity and not without poignancy, only
made the researcher reflect on the nature of the system he wanted to leave.
Following this conversation, representatives of the district party committee (raikom) spent two entire days with the applicant, adopting first a
menacing tone and later a conciliatory one, pointing out that Israel was a
fascist country and that the 6migr6 might well be unemployed. At one
point, he feels, they tried to provoke him by suggesting, "perhaps you are
leaving because you experienced antisemitism here." He quickly answered
"of course not," in order not to expose himself to the charge of anti-Soviet
slander, and in front of two "reliable" witnesses. As a result of his applica-
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tion, several of his articles already in press were withdrawn, but most of
his colleagues remained cordial to the very end of the stay in the USSR. 22
Others' experiences have not been so mild. A former correspondent of
Literaturnaiagazeta, which has been playing a leading role in the anti-Zionist
campaign, describes the hostility of his colleagues as soon as they learned
that he had applied to emigrate. "No one in the office greeted me, no one
bade me farewell. People with whom I had worked for years simply cut
me." The correspondent's phone was bugged, he was followed and
harassed by the KGB, and his application to leave was denied several
times. 23 The relatives, too, of potential 6migr~s are adversely affected by
their application to leave. One woman's father opposed her emigration,
although he did not stand in her way. As a result of her emigration, the
father, a scholar employed by the Academy of Sciences, could no longer
publish. An article of his was removed from a scholarly journal about to
go to press.
The editor of the journal told him, "you know, of course, we could have
printed it but it was forbidden .... " As soon as people found out that the
article had been thrown out of the journal, the editors of other journals and
other publishing houses heard about it and took it for a signal: They'd also
be better off not printing him. 24
Not surprisingly, Soviet claims and Western reports regarding the process of emigration vary considerably. Soviet officials insist that the great
majority of applicants leave routinely, with the claim made repeatedly that
"out of the total number of persons who have submitted applications to
emigrate, 98.4 percent have been allowed to do so." 25 But the same source,
Colonel V. S. Obidin, head of the All-Union OVIR, has admitted that in
1975 and 1976 alone, over 1,000 people who had been refused permission
previously were allowed to leave. 26 The present head of OVIR, Konstantin
Zotov, claimed that on January 1, 1980 his office had only 11,845 applications to emigrate and that the number of those who had been "temporarily" refused permission to leave was "very small, one might say
inconsequential." 27 According to Israeli sources, about 300,000 Soviet citizens have requested vyzovs but have not yet left, and some have concluded
that nearly 300,000 people have been refused permission to emigrate. 28
This is misleading for two reasons: the same person may receive several
vyzovs, because several different persons invite him to leave or because the
same person issues an invitation several times (since many vyzovs never
arrive at their destination); also, people who receive vyzovs do not always
apply to emigrate, either because they have not requested the vyzovs, or
because, having requested it, they decide to reconsider or to postpone their
emigration. Thus in Georgia, between 1968 and 1977, 61,815 visas were
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requested; according to the 1970 census, there are only 55,400 Jews in
Georgia. Some are "driven to the conclusion that the 1970 population
29
census contained inaccuracies and understated the Jewish population."
An alternative explanation is that Georgian Jews received multiple vyzovs.
In light of the strong family ties of the Georgians, on the one hand, and
the absence of plausible explanations for "inaccuracies" in the 1970 census,
on the other, the latter explanation seems more convincing.
Even taking into account these factors, the discrepancy between invitations issued and permissions granted seems larger than Soviet sources
indicate. Of those applying, more than 1.6 percent are refused. Jewish
emigration activists in the USSR estimate that the number of applications
rejected grew in 1980 from about 10,000 to about 50,000.30 In light of the
drastic reduction in emigration, these figures seem entirely plausible. A
survey of 1,035 6migr6s conducted under the auspices of the U.S. congressional commission created in 1976 to monitor implementation of the Helsinki agreement of August 1975, found that 278 had departed the USSR
before the Helsinki accord was signed, and 757 had left after it. Of the
pre-Helsinki group, nearly one-third reported that they had been refused
permission to leave, whereas among the post-Helsinki 6migr6s the proportion of refusals declined to 15 percent. In a 1978 congressional study of 235
emigrants, 17 percent reported having been refused permission to emigrate. All three figures are considerably higher than the Soviet statistic of
1.6 percent. Moreover, of the post-Helsinki 6migr6s who had been refused,
a quarter had been refused three to six times, and 11 percent had been
refused eight or more times. 31
Almost one-fifth of the respondents had experienced difficulties in receiving their vyzovs, and this was especially true of those in the smaller cities
of the RSFSR. Although most of the respondents were over eighteen at the
time of application, nearly three-quarters had to document parental approval. Nearly all of the pre- Helsinki 6migr6s, but only 32 percent of the
later wave, had to submit a klharakterisfika, and over a third of the later
6migr6s had been forced to leave their jobs as a result of their application. 32 Eighty-five percent of the post-Helsinki applicants received their
visas within a year of application, but only 68 percent of the earlier applicants did so.
The prospective post-Helsinki emigrants generally had to wait a shorter time
for final approval than those who preceded them. Seventy-five percent of the
later sampling reported waiting six months or less for their emigration approval, whereas only 59 percent of the earlier emigrants received approvals
in that short a time. Nevertheless, nearly one post-Helsinki applicant in eight
had to wait from one to six years for an exit visa, still a lower percentage than
the 22 percent of the pre-Helsinki grouping. 33
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So carefully is Soviet emigration policy making (and, of course policy
making generally) veiled from public scrutiny, that one cannot be certain
at what level and by whom the major decisions are made. It is striking that
emigration has been disproportionately heavy from some areas, and light
from others. Until 1980, about 11 percent of the total number of Jews in
the USSR (1970 census) had been issued exit permits. If one compares the
number of exit permits per republic with the number of Jews in the republic (as reported in the 1970 and 1979 censuses), one observes great variation. 34 At one extreme, 51.7 percent of the Jews in Georgia have received
exit permits; at the other, 0.6 percent of those in Kazakhstan received
permission to leave. In Lithuania, over 40 percent of the Jews were issued
permits, whereas in the RSFSR, where about 37 percent of all Soviet Jews
reside, only 1.9 percent of the population have been issued exit permits.
The chances of getting a permit vary significantly by republic. Thus, 83
percent of those requesting affidavits in Lithuania received an exit permit;
63 percent in Latvia; 33 percent each in the RSFSR and Belorussia; and 31
percent in Tadzhikistan. This leads to the conclusion that the disproportions in emigration from different republics are notexplained solely, or even
mainly, by the greater number of applications in some, and smaller number
in others. The rates of granting exit permits vary so widely that one can say
that it is easier to leave from the two Baltic republics (the number of Jews
in Estonia is very small) than it is from Russia and Belorussia. However,
it reimains true that a greater proportion of the Jews in the Baltic, Georgia,
and other peripheral areas apply to leave in the first place. This is no doubt
due to higher levels of Jewish consciousness and, in the case of the Baltic
and West Ukrainian areas, greater general alienation from the Soviet state
generally and from Russian domination especially. A detailed comparison
of the number of vyzovs and visas by republic can be made by studying
tables I and II.
Still open is the question of how and by whom these variations are
determined. Some have suggested that the variation is so great that it must
be due to different local policies being pursued by republic level officials
or even lower level authorities. 35 An alternative explanation is that central
directives have been issued which give higher emigration quotas to some
regions, and lower ones to others, in line with national calculations. For
example, it would be reasonable for the central authorities to allow Georgian officials to issue more exit visas because Georgian Jews are not very
highly educated or skilled, and contribute less to the Soviet economy than,
say, the scientific intelligentsia concentrated in Moscow or Leningrad. At
the same time, the Georgian Jews are viewed as a disruptive element in an
already troublesome republic, another reason for getting rid of them
through emigration. Similar arguments may obtain for the Baltic republics,
Moldavia, and the West Ukraine: each of these areas in its own way poses
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problems of ethnic and religious dissent to the central authorities. In the
first half of 1980, emigration permits were severely curtailed in the Ukraine
and, to a far lesser extent, in Leningrad, but the number of permits in other
areas grew. 36 This may reflect either a unilateral Ukrainian policy or a
central directive to the Ukraine; most likely, the Ukrainian authorities were
acting on orders from Moscow.
Even if emigration quotas are set in Moscow, republic and local officials
probably welcome Jewish emigration. Because Jews overwhelmingly assimilate into the Russian, rather than local cultures (except in Georgia),
their emigration removes some agents of Russification, opens up job and
housing opportunities for local residents, and expands opportunities for
mobility of non-Jews. Finally, in some areas, traditional antisemitism may
also be at play, providing another incentive for local officials to cooperate
in getting rid of the Jews, even though that is precisely what some of the
Jews want. Differential levels of Jewish consciousness and nationalism,
different types of family, economic, and vocational structures, and different calculations and motivations by republic and local officials all help to
account for the uneven results of Soviet emigration policy. Until the authorities make explicit their policy rationales and processes, discussion of
them must remain in the realm of informed speculation.

REFUGEES OR IMMIGRANTS?
Obviously, Soviet authorities do not regard 6migr6s from the USSR as
refugees in any sense, but rather as fools, victims of Zionist propaganda,
avaricious n'er-do-wells, or ingrates and traitors. As illustrated above, the
government tries to keep the people in the country rather than drive them
out, although in a larger sense it is government policies that drive the Jews
to emigrate. "Emigr6" is a word with a negative connotation in Soviet
rhetoric since the revolution.
Israel's view of the 6migr6s is more complicated. Until 1968, it was not
publicly admitted by either the Israeli Government or the press that there
were Soviet immigrants coming to Israel, and the media referred to the flow
as the "unification-of-families immigration." This policy stemmed from
Israel's anxiety about offending the Soviet Union and causing it to halt
emigration. The USSR, fearful of internal pressures for expanded emigration opportunities and under attack from her Arab allies for allowing
potential soldiers to go to Israel, denied that there was any mass emigration. The Soviet media insisted for some time that only old and sick people
were being allowed, on humanitarian grounds alone, to leave to be reunited with families from whom they had been separated as a result of war
and other calamities. 37 As time went on, and the dimensions of the emi-
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gration became widely known, this Soviet theme was muted (although not
abandoned altogether), and the Israelis felt more secure about publicly
acknowledging the size and significance of the Soviet immigration, publishing comprehensive data on it for the first time only in 1976.38
When increasing numbers of Soviet Jews arriving in Vienna chose to go
to the United States rather than to Israel, a bitter dispute developed between Israeli and Jewish Agency officials, chagrined at the loss of potential
immigrants, and the organizations, such as HIAS and the Joint Distribution
Committee, which maintained the "drop-outs" (an Israeli pejorative term)
in transit and facilitated their entry to the United States, Canada, and other
countries. 39 Most of those coming to the United States entered as political
refugees under the "parole power" of the attorney general to admit
them. 40 When the 1980 Refugee Act seemed to make clear that in American eyes, Soviet Jewish 6migr6s are political refugees, 41 Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin and Jewish Agency Chairman Aryeh Dulzin reacted
angrily, arguing that since the creation of the State of Israel no Jew need
be considered a refugee, since he or she had a homeland which would
accept him or her as a citizen almost automatically. 42 (Under the Law of
Return, Jews coming to Israel can acquire citizenship within a few months,
if they so desire. 43) They predicted that the U.S. legislation would further
accelerate the trend toward emigration to the United States and would
induce Soviet Jews, already resettled in Israel, to migrate to the United
States.
Of course, the Israeli reaction was based on a tacit equation of "refugee"
with "homeless," an equation not made in the U.S. law, and also ignored
the fact that Soviet 6migr~s who had become Israeli citizens-and nearly
all of them become so within three months of their arrival-would not be
considered "refugees" by the Americans. Moreover, there has been no
increase in the number of ex-Soviet Israelis entering the United States. In
fact, some of them complain that their automatic acquisition of Israeli
citizenship, done when few understand the Hebrew forms and all of the
implications of this step, has effectively deprived them of the opportunity
to emigrate to the United States should they change their minds about
settling in Israel. Thus, a small minority of the ex-Soviet Israelis covet
refugee status, and some of them claim to prefer it to Israeli citizenship.
Israeli and Zionist officials are discomfited by the notion of Jews as refugees. They agree that Jews in the USSR are "persecuted" or have "a
well-founded fear of persecution" but, they maintain, since there are no
bars to Soviet Jews finding a home and citizenship in the country which
Zionists regard as the country of all Jews, Jews should not be considered
refugees. Since those in Israel are not seen as refugees even by the Americans, the disagreement is over those who are still in transit. Clearly, the
Israelis would prefer that the entry of Soviet Jews into the United States

58

TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS OF REFUGEES

not be made easy and, perhaps, that these immigrants be denied the status
of refugees.
It seems quite clear that Soviet Jews qualify as refugees under the 1980
Act, and equally clear that those who have become Israeli citizens do not
qualify as refugees. The Act does, therefore, seem to provide incentives for
Soviet 6migr6s arriving in Vienna to opt first for the United States because,
as many of them point out, they can later go to Israel from the United
States and easily become Israeli citizens, but if they choose Israel first, and
thus became Israeli citizens in short order, they will not be "refugees" in
American terms and will find it very difficult to immigrate to the United
States. If Israel were to grant them "temporary resident" status, as it does
to the great majority of American and West European immigrants, it might
attract more Soviet Jews initially, as they could presumably protect their
refugee status (although perhaps obtaining an Israeli laissez-passerwould be
enough to cause them to lose it). However, in the long run these people
might wind up immigrating to the United States anyway.
But these speculations are beyond the scope of this article and the legal
knowledge of the author. The purpose of the article has been to investigate
whether the status of refugee, as defined in the 1980 Act, is appropriate
to Soviet Jews. If the answer is somewhat equivocal, so is the status of
Soviet 6migr6s. Human situations cannot always be fitted neatly into the
categories of law and legislation. It is more important that immigrants and
host societies try to fit themselves to each other, working out those mutual
accommodations and balances that make for optimal social life.
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